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Abstract. The paper consists of two parts. The first critically analyses
Meyer’s [2005] version of the triviality objection to presentism (according
to which, presentism is either trivial or untenable), and tries to show that
his argument is untenable because  contrary to what he claimed  he did
not take into account the entire possible spectrum of interpretations of the
presentist’s thesis. In the second, positive part of the paper, it is shown
that a leading form of tensed theory of time postulates the same ontology
as presentism and that it avoids the triviality problem which means that it
can be used to generate an alternative formulation of presentism which is
no longer vulnerable to the triviality objection.
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1. Introduction: Meyer’s objection
Repeating the well-known objections to presentism,1 Meyer [2005] at-
tempts to show that presentism, which claims, roughly, that only the
present exists, is either trivial or untenable.2 He does it, however, using
∗ The research contained in this paper has been supported by the National Sci-
ence Centre, Poland, grant OPUS 11 no. 2016/21/B/HS1/00807.
1 See, for example, [Merricks, 1995, p. 523], [Zimmerman, 1998, pp. 208–210],
[Sider, 1999, pp. 325–327], [Lombard, 1999, pp. 254–255], [Lombard, 2010], [Crisp,
2004a,b], [Ludlow, 2004] and [Savitt, 2006].
2 Similar arguments have been repeated in chapter 9 of [Meyer, 2013].
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a line of reasoning which unfortunately contains flaws and is indefensi-
ble. I shall criticize his reasoning and next show that the debate between
presentism and eternalism is not only genuine but also concerns a deep
metaphysical problem of our world.
I shall begin with Meyer’s minor mistake: he mentioned [Sklar, 1981]
as one of the authors who “argue that presentism is incompatible with
the theory of relativity, and thus false a posteriori” [Meyer, 2005, p. 213].
However, contrary to what is claimed by Meyer, in “Time, reality, and
relativity” and other his papers, Sklar did not maintain that presentism
is incompatible with the theory of relativity.3 Indeed, just the opposite
is true as Sklar wrote: “One thing is certain. Acceptance of relativity
cannot force one into acceptance or rejection of any of the traditional
metaphysical views about the reality of past and future.”4
This point is interesting because, since the discovery of the theory
of relativity, there have been debates about metaphysical consequences
of this theory regarding the objectivity of the distinction between the
past, the present, and the future with many physicists and philosophers
on both sides of the fence: let us recall that Einstein, Weyl, Russell,
Quine, Putnam, Smart, Lewis, Mellor, Horwich stand on one side (as
denying this possibility), and Heisenberg, von WeizsÃďker, Jeans, Broad,
Shimony, Prior and Stein on the other (as accepting it). For example,
Stein [1968, 1991] maintained that the theory of relativity does not refute
presentism but imposes constraints on our notion of the present such that
it is reduced to a point, and Sklar took into account the possibility of the
reconciliation of presentism with the theory of relativity in his works.5
So, if Meyer is right that “presentism is either trivial or untenable”,
one of the stances would be a trivial view and such debates would be
pointless. Of course, it is possible that the concerns of, for example,
3 Sklar is, generally speaking, an adherent of the MIMO principle “metaphysics
in, metaphysics out” [see, e.g., Sklar, 1992, p. 9], speaking that when we interpret a
scientific theory, “the metaphysical stance one ought to adopt follows only from the
adoption of a number of fundamentally philosophical postulates” [Sklar, 1985, p. 289].
4 Sklar’s [1981], that is the paper “Time, reality, and relativity”, first appeared
in [Healy, 1981, pp. 129–142] and was reprinted in [Sklar, 1985, pp. 289–304]. The
quote above appeared on p. 302 of the reprinted version and other references in this
text to Sklar’s paper relate to the reprinted version as well.
5 See [Sklar, 1985, p. 302] and [Sklar, 1992, p. 73]. In his [1974, pp. 272–275],
Sklar considered an additional possibility of the reconciliation of presentism with the
theory of relativity by relativizing the presentist’s notion of reality to an inertial state
of motion of the observer in the same manner as this is assumed for the simultaneity.
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Broad, Prior, Shimony and Stein were pointless but can this really be
the case?
Meyer [2005, p. 213] defines presentism as the thesis:
P: Nothing exists that is not present.
Difficulties arise, as it is well known, when we ponder which notion of
existence is used in P: the usual tensed meaning from natural language,
in which the ‘exists’ in P is the ordinary present tense of the verb ‘to
exist’, or tenseless called by Meyer temporal existence and defined by
him in the following way: “an object exists temporally just in case it
exists at some time or other” [Meyer, 2005, p. 214]. It is easy to see that
in the first case P is trivially true:
P1: Nothing exists now that is not present.
and in the second obviously false:
P2: Nothing exists temporally that is not present.
Meyer also takes into account three other possibilities of understanding
the notion of existence: an intermediate (between tensed and tenseless)
notion of existence*, in which objects exist* only for certain choices of
time t, and not for all times, as in the case of temporal existence (p. 216),
existence outside time, and existence in other possible world. Thus we
have the following possibilities:
P3: Nothing exists* that is not present.
P4: Nothing exists outside time that is not present.
P5: Nothing exists in other possible worlds that is not present.6
P3 is true only for the present time t in which case P3 is again trivially
true; in other cases it is obviously false. And neither of the theses P4
and P5 are recognizably presentist theses. Meyer concludes that because
“there is thus an entire spectrum of interpretations of the presentist’s
thesis” and “since these readings exhaust all possible alternatives, pre-
sentism is therefore either trivial, untenable, or a balanced mix of the
two.” [Meyer, 2005, p. 216]
6 The notions of existence outside time, and existence in other possible worlds
are understood by Meyer [2005, pp. 214–215] as possible explications of a notion of
existence simpliciter which could be an alternative to temporal existence.
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2. Meyer’s objection extended
Before I begin to analyze Meyer’s claim, I would like to recall that the
triviality objection can be raised against the eternalist thesis as well,7
and the same refers to Meyer’s version of the objection. Let us consider
the eternalist thesis in the form:
E: Past, present, and future objects exist.8
And let us now consider consecutively all senses of ‘exist’ proposed by
Meyer:
E1: Past, present, and future objects exist now.
E2: Past, present, and future objects exist temporally.
E3: Past, present, and future objects exist*.
E4: Past, present, and future objects exist outside time.
E5: Past, present, and future objects exist in other possible worlds.
It is easy to see that E1 and E3 are obviously false, E2 is trivially true,
and neither of the theses E4 and E5 are recognizably eternalist theses.
Thus the triviality objection refers to the eternalist thesis as well because
all competitors agree on the truth values of E1–E3. This would mean 
if his argument is correct  that Meyer’s restriction only to the critique
of presentism is misleading.9
3. Meyer’s objection refuted
If Meyer is right that presentism is a trivial position then a question
arises: is there really nothing to dispute and have we been misled for
so long? I do not think so  at least, it is not proven by the (original
or extended) argument given by Meyer. For his argument is based on a
serious interpretative mistake: he claims  I recall  that he takes into
account “an entire spectrum of interpretations of the presentist’s thesis”
[Meyer, 2005, p. 216] and that “these readings exhaust all possible alter-
natives” [Meyer, 2005, p. 216], but he did not show that the considered
interpretations are really exhaustive. Moreover, it is doubtful whether
7 It was noticed by Savitt [2006].
8 See, for example, [Sider, 1999, p. 326] and [Rea, 2003, pp. 246–247].
9 Lombard [2010], for example, claims that there is no real controversy between
presentism and eternalism.
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such a proof can exist since even newer versions of presentism are being
proposed. Thus, for example, two dynamic versions of full-blooded pre-
sentism were developed by means of the notion becoming [Gołosz, 2013,
2017b], and by means of the notion of dynamic existence [Gołosz, 2013,
2015, 2018], which were not taken into account by Meyer. Both ver-
sions attempt to make an essential problemshift (to use Lakatos’ [1970]
terminology) in our understanding of presentism: they draw back from
treating the thesis that only the present exists as a main ontological
thesis of presentism because  in accordance with the long presentist’s
tradition  the present is identified there with what exists. Here are some
examples:
Before directly discussing the notion of the present, I want to discuss
the notion of the real. These two concepts are closely connected; indeed
on my view they are one and the same concept, and the present simply
is the real considered in relation to two peculiar species of unreality,
namely the past and the future. [Prior, 1970, p. 245]
The pastness of the event, that is its having taken place, is not the same
thing as the event itself; nor is its futurity; but the presentness of an
event is just the event. The presentness of my lecturing, for instance,
is just my lecturing. [Prior, 1970, p. 247]
To be present is simply to be, to exist, and to be present at a given
time is just to exist at that time  no less and no more.
[Christensen, 1993, p. 168]
On a presentist ontology, to exist temporally is to be present. Since
presentness is identical with temporal existence (or occurrence) and ex-
istence is not a property, neither is presentness a property. Presentness
is the act of temporal being. [Craig, 1997, p. 37]
As a result of such an approach to the notion of the present (to use Prior’s
[1970] words), the statement that only the present exists can be treated
as analytically true. It does not trivialize presentism, however, for in the
proposed problemshift, the thesis saying that the flow of time exists (in
the form of becoming or dynamic existence of the world) becomes the
main ontological thesis of presentism, and whether time does flow or not
is not a trivial problem.
The first version of dynamic presentism introduces presentism in the
following form (expressed in tensed language) [see Gołosz, 2013, p. 54;
Gołosz, 2017b, p. 292]
Becoming: The events which our world consists of become (come into
being to pass).
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where becoming, as Broad’s absolute becoming, is a primitive notion
which cannot be further analysed.10 This thesis states, following Broad,
the reality of the flow of time in the way which avoids the question of
the rate of time’s passage. What is important, it can be shown that
Becoming also expresses precisely the intended ontology of presentism
without trivialising it [see Gołosz, 2017b, p. 292]. To show this, it is
enough to recall that the presentist can identify the present with the
totality of events that become (come into being to pass) if we assume,
following Broad, the ontology of events, and in a similar way the past
with the totality of events that became (came into being to pass), and the
future with the totality of events that will become (will come into being
to pass) but do not yet exist. Now, if we take into account that Becoming
states that events become (come into being to pass), we can easily see that
it leads precisely to the intended presentist ontology which  and that is
crucial here  is dynamic: events’ becoming (coming into being to pass)
means their becoming firstly present, and then past. That we identify
(tensed) existence with being present is here accepted and has no effect
because Becoming is now the main ontological thesis of presentism.
Let me introduce the second version of dynamic presentism which
swaps the ontology of events for the ontology of things as fundamental
objects. Now, the main ontological thesis is [see Gołosz, 2013, p. 55;
Gołosz, 2015, pp. 814–819; Gołosz, 2018, p. 404]:
Dynamic Reality: All of the objects that our world consists of exist
dynamically.
where Dynamic Reality (DR) is expressed in tensed language and the
notion of dynamic existence is a primitive notion (just as Broad’s ab-
solute becoming) which can be roughly characterised by the following
postulates:
(i) the notion of dynamic existence is tensed;
10 “To ‘become present’ is, in fact, just to ‘become’, in an absolute sense; i.e.,
to ‘come to pass in Biblical phraseology’, or, most simply, to ‘happen’. Sentences
like ‘This water became hot’ or ‘This noise became louder’ record facts of qualitative
change. Sentences like ‘This event became present’ record facts of absolute becoming.
[. . . ] I do not suppose that so simple and fundamental a notion as that of absolute
becoming can be analyzed, and I am quite certain that it cannot be analyzed in
terms of a non-temporal copula and some kind of temporal predicate.” [Broad, 1938,
280–281].
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(ii) things dynamically exist in the sense of coming into being to en-
dure;11
(iii) events (which are acts of acquiring, losing or changing properties
by dynamically existing things and their collections) dynamically
exist in the sense of coming into being to pass.
The term ‘objects’ applies to things and events; however things are
treated here as primary objects, while events are secondary. Again, as in
the case of Becoming, DR is accompanied by three definitions:
The present ≡ The totality of objects that dynamically exist.
The past ≡ The totality of objects that dynamically existed.
The future ≡ The totality of objects that will dynamically exist.
Now, it should be emphasized that not only does DR states that time
flows but it also provides us with the intended ontology for presentism
without trivializing it because it says that exactly those objects dynam-
ically exist that we call present. The same concerns the past and the
future because DR says that all of the objects that our world consists of
exist dynamically, which means that it is unnecessary to talk addition-
ally about not-existing (dynamically) objects (that is, the past and the
future). That is, we have achieved the intended effect with the single
thesis DR and three definitions of the present, the past, and the future.
Is DR trivial? The answer has to be negative because the notion of
the present is not involved in this thesis and neither are the past nor the
future involved. And, it is obvious that the definitions cannot be accused
of being trivial. DR simply states that all of the objects which our world
consists of exist dynamically (which is equivalent to the existence of the
flow of time), which can be true or false but for sure is not trivial. On
the contrary, we have good reason to believe that DR is true. This claim
needs, of course, more justification than the sentence given above, but
it is not a problem here: I wanted only to show that there are versions
11 The enduring of things is usually defined as a persistence over time by being
wholly present at each time but, as noticed by Merricks [1994, p. 182], “[. . . ] the heart
of the endurantist’s ontology is expressed by claims like ‘[object] O at t is identical
with [object] O at t∗’.” For the author of this paper, this second condition alone
suffices for the definition of endurantism and is a better criterion of endurance, so it
will be used in what follows. According to the competing view, namely perdurantism,
things perdure, meaning persistence through time by having temporal parts, persisting
things are here treated as mereological aggregates of temporal parts, none of which
are strictly identical with one another.
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of presentism which were not taken into account by Meyer, so they are
counterexamples to his claim that he took into account “an entire spec-
trum of interpretations of the presentist’s thesis” [Meyer, 2005, p. 216].12
The point which is exploited above appears to be very important be-
cause a presentism devoid of dynamics  although logically consistent 
seems to be inconsistent with our experience. The transitory character
of the concepts of being past, present and future were emphasized by
St. Augustine and is underlined today:
[I]f nothing were passing, there would be no past time: and if nothing
were coming, there should be no time to come: and if nothing were,
there should now be no present time. [. . . ] As for the present, should
it always be present and never pass into times past, verily it should not
be time but eternity. If then time present, to be time, only comes into
existence because it passeth into time past; how can we say that also
to be, whose cause of being is, that it shall not be: that we cannot,
forsooth, affirm that time is, but only because it is tending not to be.13
[Augustine, 1912, p. 239]
.
St. Augustine noticed that if nothing passed away, the time called the
past was not; and if nothing were coming, the time to come was not
either; and if nothing were, then the time called the present could not
be either. If we ignore this transitory character of the concepts of being
past, present and future, we receive a ‘petrified’ or ‘frozen’ version of
presentism which is  to be sure  logically possible but which is incom-
patible with our experience and as such should be of no interest for
presentists. This point, unfortunately, was ignored by Meyer and this
means that his analysis of presentism is one-sided and inadequate, just
as in the case of ignoring the problem of triviality for eternalism.
I shall also try to demonstrate later that he seriously misinterprets
the debate between the tensed and tenseless theories of time, or A-
theories and B-theories of time  as they are often called at present,
12 Other versions of dynamic presentism are introduced by Dainton [2014, pp. 87–
95]; however, I will not analyse the problem of whether they are able to escape the
triviality objection.
13 See also [Loux, 2006, p. 221], where is highlighted that adherents of different
versions of A-theory (the tensed theory of time) assume the transitory nature of
the A-determinations and represent different possible ways of expressing it. The
stipulation that presentism has to admit the existence of the flow of time was called
St. Augustine’s Condition in [Gołosz, 2017b, p. 288].
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and that this debate  when correctly interpreted  can be seen at least
in the case of a leading version of the former ones as a discussion between
presentism and eternalism as this controversy is seen from the point of
view of our language and its relation to the world. What is more, I would
like to show below that the debate between presentism and eternalism,
seen as the dispute between the tensed and tenseless theories of time (or
A-theories an B-theories of time), is not only immune to the objection of
triviality but seems to seriously clarify the controversy as well. Undoubt-
edly, there are other versions of the tensed theories of time (A-theories
of time) such as the spotlight theory, the growing block theory, or the
shrinking block theory [see, e.g., [Loux, 2006, p. 221]; and [Smith, 2005,
p. 478]], however, for the purposes of this paper, it is sufficient, that 
using the words of [Loux, 2006, pp. 221 and 235]  the most popular
version of the tensed theories of time (A-theories), for example, these
championed by Prior, Bigelow, Craig, advocate presentism while their
opponents (for example, Smart, and Mellor) eternalism. What is most
important  as I will show  is not only that the presentist’s tensed/A-
theoretical ontology matches very well with our phenomenological expe-
rience (the present separates what is fixed, known by traces and cannot
be changed any more, that is the past, from this which can only be pre-
dicted and has no traces but, at least sometimes, can be affected, that
is, the future), but that it also corresponds perfectly well with what our
tensed language says about the world: saying that the future tensedly
exists would mean breaking the rules of language (because the future will
exist and does not exist) and we do exactly the same when saying that
the past tensedly exists (because the past did exist and does not exist).
Meyer [2005, pp. 216–219] takes into account a possibility of a defense
of presentism against the objection of triviality by referring to the debate
between tensed and tenseless theories of time; however, he quickly de-
nies the above-mentioned possibility: “The widely held view that tensed
account of time endorse presentism while tenseless theories reject it, is
simply mistaken” [Meyer, 2005, p. 217]. He tries to show this by spelling
out the theses P1 and P2 in two different ways:
P1 P2
tensed theory ∀x(Ex ⊃ Ex) ∀x(MEx ⊃ Ex)
tenseless theory ∀x(Ext∗ ⊃ Ext∗) ∀x(∃t Ext ⊃ Ext∗)
where the monadic existence predicate ‘E’ is used to account for time-
relative existence claims in the case of tensed theories of time, and (the
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same term) ‘E’ is a temporal “location” relation that objects bear to
times in the case of tenseless theories of time; the primitive sentential
tense operator ‘M’ means ‘at some time’, and ‘t∗’ is the present time
(time of utterance) while ‘t’ is a variable ranging over times.
We therefore obtain again the trivial view P1 and the obviously false
P2. And this means, according to Meyer, that “tensed theories neither
support nor require a non-trivial form of presentism, and even the pro-
ponent of the tenseless theory of time has to accept the trivial presentist
thesis P1.” [Meyer, 2005, p. 218]
Unfortunately, Meyer seriously misinterprets tensed and tenseless
theories of time (A-theories and B-theories of time): although adher-
ents of the former really accept sentences like P1, its triviality is not
something they have to argue about with adherents of the latter. The
adherents of the tensed theories of time (A-theories of time) need not call
into question the ‘triviality’ of P1 simply because they can treat such
sentences as analytically true consequences of their understanding (or
definition) of the notion of present: for them, to be present just means
to exist. As follows from the citations from Prior and his followers given
above, the adherents of the tensed theories of time (A-theories of time)
can simply identify presentness with existence and this is why they need
not call into question the fact that P1 is trivially true.
But, if the adherents of the tensed theories of time (A-theories of
time) do not argue with the adherents of the tenseless theories of time
(B-theories of time) about the triviality of P1, so, what do the adher-
ents of the tensed theories of time discuss with their opponents? Well,
their arguments are  and this is typical for the analytical tradition 
arguments about language and about the relation between language and
reality; strictly speaking, this is a debate as to whether the tensed struc-
ture of our language reflects the real structure of the world or not, and
as such this is a debate on a metalinguistic level. As Loux puts it, “A-
theorists will all agree that tensed language must be taken at face value:
tensed language, they say, points to irreducibly tensed properties and
irreducibly tensed states of affairs” [Loux, 2006, p. 218].14
It can be seen, for example, in Prior’s “Some free thinking about
time”, where Prior defends the reality of the passage of time, the objec-
tivity of the distinction between the past, the present, and the future,
and the indefinability of A-determinations of ‘past’, ‘present’, and ‘fu-
14 See also [Gołosz, 2011, ch. 4], where these problems are analysed.
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ture’ in terms of B-determinations of ‘earlier’ or ‘later’. Prior claims, on
the contrary, that ‘X is earlier than Y ’ means ‘At some time X was past
and Y was present’, and ‘X is later than Y ’ means the opposite of this:
People who are doing relativity physics are concerned with the relations
of before and after and simultaneity, but these aren’t the first things
as far as the real passage of time is concerned  the first thing is the
sequence of past, present, and future, and this is not just a private
or local matter, different for each one of us; on the contrary pastness,
presentness, and futurity are properties of events that are independent
of the observer; and under favourable conditions they are perceived
properties. [. . . ] I have a good friend and colleague, Professor Smart
of Adelaide, with whom I often have arguments about this. He’s an
advocate of the tapestry view of time, and says that when we say ‘X is
now past’ we just mean ‘The latest part of X is earlier than this ut-
terance.’ But, when at the end of some ordeal I say ‘Thank goodness
that’s over’, do I mean ‘The latest part of that is earlier than this
utterance’? I certainly do not; I’m not thinking about the utterance
at all, it’s overness, the nowendedness, the pastness of the thing that
I’m thinking for and nothing else. Past, and future are in fact not to
be defined in terms of earlier or later, but the other way round  ‘X is
earlier than Y ’ means ‘At some time X was past and Y was present’,
and ‘X is later than Y ’ means the opposite of this.15
[Prior, 1998, p. 106]
If the distinction between the past, the present, and the future is
objective, which was emphasized by Prior, it would mean that the tensed
structure of our language reflects the real structure of the world. As Loux
puts it (emphasizing the transitory character of A-determinations):
A-theorists take time to be irreducibly tensed. They think that the var-
ious linguistic expressions of tense (tensed verbs, predicates like ‘past’,
‘present’, and ‘future’, and referring expressions like ‘now’, ‘then’, ‘yes-
terday’, and ‘today’) point to objective features of time, features that
time would have even in a world without thinkers. But while they take
them to be objective, A-theorists hold that these features are transitory:
times, events, and objects change with respect to the various temporal
properties. [Loux, 2006, p. 217]
15 “Tapestry” is characterized by Prior as “timeless tapestry with everything
stuck there for good and all” [Prior, 1998, p. 104], and connected with the view which
is just the opposite of his own tensed view of time. All references in this text to “Some
free thinking about time” relate to the reprinted version [Prior, 1998].
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Prior also underlined the transitory character of the distinction be-
tween the past, present and future, and the reality of the passage of time.
That is why  he explained  we use past-tensed sentences to express our
experiences of yesterday, and the future-tensed sentences to talk about
our plans.16 What is of great importance here is that we receive this
way in the case of Prior’s version of a tensed theory of time (A-theory)
the same ontological theses which characterize presentism.
The adherents of the tenseless theories of time (B-theories) will, of
course, deny that the tensed structure of our language reflects the real
structure of the world and, as a consequence, the objectivity of the dis-
tinction between the past, the present, and the future, as well as the
objectivity of the passage of time. This can be seen, for example, in
the last part of the quote from “The free thinking . . . ” [Prior, 1998,
p. 106], where Prior wrote about his arguments with Smart about the
translatability of tensed sentences into the tenseless language, and what
we find there is Prior’s famous argument ‘Thank goodness that’s over’.17
The adherents of the tenseless theories of time, such as [Goodman, 1951;
Russell, 1903; Smart, 1963] claimed that tensed sentences are translat-
able into tenseless sentences and, as such, do not describe events and
things with their real properties, while their adversaries, such as for
example [Broad, 1938; Prior, 1959, 1970], denied this [see, e.g., Loux,
2006, pp. 215–218].
After 1980, the debate changed: the thesis about the translatability
of tensed sentences turned out to be untenable because sentences with
temporal indexicals, such as for example ‘now’, are untranslatable into
sentences not containing them.18 Instead of this, adherents of tensed and
tenseless theories of time started to discuss whether the tensed sentences
have tenseless states affairs as truth conditions (or truthmakers).19 This
16 Recall Prior’s claims: “But, when at the end of some ordeal I say ‘Thank
goodness that’s over’, do I mean ‘The latest part of that is earlier than this utterance’?
I certainly do not; I’m not thinking about the utterance at all, it’s overness, the
nowendedness, the pastness of the thing that I’m thinking for and nothing else” [Prior,
1998, p. 106].
17 See, e.g., [Prior, 1959], where the argument is developed in a broader way.
18 See, e.g, [Smith, 1987, p. 372] and [Loux, 2006, pp. 224–228)]. Smith remarked,
following Castaneda, that “the basic kinds of indexicals are irreducible to each other,
so that tenses and ‘now’ for example cannot be systematically translated by indexical-
containing expressions like ‘this time’ or ‘simultaneously with this utterance’.”
19 See, e.g., [Mellor, 1981], [Smart, 1980], [Loux, 2006, pp. 205 and 226–228] and
[Smith, 2005, p. 475].
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became a crucial question because if truth conditions (or truthmakers)
involving only unchanging relations of temporal simultaneity and priority
suffice as explanations of whether the tensed sentences are true, this
would mean that events and things in the world do not have changing,
monadic properties of futurity, presentness or pastness. In other words,
it would mean that there is nothing in the world corresponding to the
tensed structure of our language or, at least, that such an assumption is
gratuitous. Mellor, for example, described the debate in such a way:
[. . . ] what both parties mean by a belief’s truth condition is its so-called
‘truthmaker’, i.e. what in the world makes it true. What we disagree
about is whether A-facts or B-facts  in the substantial sense of ‘fact’
for which I argue explicitly  makes temporal beliefs true. This is a real
issue, for if B-facts do this job, A-facts do not; and if they do not, they
do not exist, since this is what they exist to do.20
[Mellor, 1998, p. XI]
In Mellor’s [1998] own indexical theory of A-propositions, “ ‘e is present’
is made true at t by e’s being located at t, and similarly for other A-
propositions” [Mellor, 1998, p. XII and ch. 3].
So the metalinguistic debate about truth conditions and truthmakers
of tensed sentences, propositions, and temporal beliefs is  as a matter
of fact  a debate about whether there are the objective A-facts and A-
properties of being past, present and future in the world. And if we
recall the transitory character of the concepts of being past, present and
future, it becomes obvious that the debate involves the problem of the
reality of the flow of time and that the discussion about truth conditions
and truthmakers of tensed sentences and tensed propositions  as with
the earlier debate about the translatability of tensed sentences  is a
debate between presentism and eternalism, as this problem is seen from
the point of view of our language. Mellor, who is a well-known eternalist,
states explicitly in the quotation above that if A-propositions have B-
facts as their truthmakers, A-facts concerning properties of being past,
present and future in the world) do not exist. And if they do not exist,
their changes, that is the flow of time, also do not exist: there is only a
sequence of A-beliefs in us and the flow of time is a myth:
20 Here A-facts are contingent facts about the A-times of events (for example,
that an event is present), and B-facts include necessary facts (“if there are such facts”
[Mellor, 1998, p. 19]  Mellor adds), and contingent facts about how much earlier
or later events are than each other  and hence about what their B-times are. See
[Mellor, 1998, p. 19].
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But then we agents must be constantly changing our A-beliefs, espe-
cially our beliefs about what is happening now, in order to try to keep
them true. These changes in us, mostly prompted by our senses, are
what make us think of time as flowing, even though it does not flow.
For without such properties as being past, present and future, time
cannot flow, i.e. make events change from being future to being present
and then to being past. [Mellor, 1998, p. 4]
Again, similar to the case of older tensed and tenseless theories of time,
A-theorists and B-theorists defend or deny (respectively) the objectivity
of the flow of time and the objectivity of the distinction between the
present, the past and the future; that is, they assume or deny (respec-
tively) the ontological theses of presentism.
Of course, none of metalanguage claims of the type:
MLP: A-propositions (or A-sentences) need A-facts as their truthmakers
(B-facts are not sufficient for their truth).
MLE: A-propositions (or A-sentences) have B-facts as their truthmakers.
MLP′: The tensed structure of our language corresponds to the real
metaphysical structure of our world (tensed language points to irre-
ducibly tensed properties, that is, A-properties, and irreducibly tensed
states of affairs, that is, A-facts).
MLE′: The tensed structure of our language does not correspond to
the real metaphysical structure of our world (the tensed sentences have
B-facts as their truthmakers).
is trivially true (they cannot be proved with help of meanings of the
words and logical laws) or obviously false because it is not obvious
whether A-propositions and A-sentences have, or do not have, A-facts as
their truthmakers. This means that the debate between presentism and
eternalism is not trivial: on the contrary, it raises profound metaphysi-
cal and epistemological questions with regards to what the metaphysical
structure of the world is.
4. How can we understand the debate between
presentism and eternalism?
We are approaching the questions mentioned in the last section through
the analysis of the language of time as it is carried out in the discussion
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between the adherents of the tensed and tenseless theories of time (A-
and B-theorists). If we take this route, we simply consider which lan-
guage  tensed or tenseless  correctly describes the metaphysical struc-
ture of the world. A-theorists are convinced that the various linguistic
expressions of tense, that is tensed verbs, predicates like ‘past’, ‘present’,
and ‘future’, and referring expressions like ‘now’, ‘then’, ‘yesterday’, and
‘today’ point to objective features of time, and  what is more  they
hold that these features are transitory: times, events, and objects change
with respect to the various temporal properties [Loux, 2006, pp. 217
and 221]. This must involve a commitment to a real passage of time
in the world in some form, as was emphasized by Prior.21 For it seems
to be obvious that if the tensed theory of time is correct, and there are
changing objective A-properties and A-facts in the world, time really
has to flow because this passage of time is responsible for the transitory
character of these features.
It follows from the above considerations that both debates between
presentism and eternalism and between the tensed and tenseless theories
of time (A-theory and B-theory) do not relate to heses P1, P2, E1, E2
only but rather should be related to the much deeper problem of what
the metaphysical structure of the world is, which involves the issues of
the transitory character of the concepts of being past, present and future
and the existence of the flow of time as well. When we approach this
problem from the starting point which is our language, we ponder which
notion of existence  tensed or tenseless  should be applied to the world,
or  more generally  whether the tensed structure of our language cor-
responds to the metaphysical structure of the world or, yet otherwise,
whether tensed language points to irreducibly tensed properties and ir-
reducibly tensed states of affairs or rather B-facts are sufficient for the
truth of tensed sentences. We can resolve these problems not only by
analyzing the theses MLP, MLE, MLP′, MLE′, but also by discussing
such problems as:
1. Does time really flow?22
2. If it does, what the flow of time consist in?
21 “I believe that what we see as a progress of events is a progress of events, a
coming to pass of one thing after another.” [Prior, 1998, p. 104]
22 See citations from Prior in fn. 21 with a positive answer and Mellor’s [1998,
p. 4] with a negative one.
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3. If it doesn’t, what is the source of the illusion of the existence of the
flow of time?
4. What is the nature of cross-time relations and how can they be ex-
plained by presentists?23
5. Are presentism and the tensed theory of time compatible with the
theory of relativity?24
6. Why do we have traces of past events but do not find traces of fu-
ture events if all physical interactions (with the exception of weak
interactions) are time-reversal symmetric?25
7. How is it possible that we can affect (as we believe) future events
but we cannot affect the past if all physical interactions (with the
exception of weak interactions) are time reversal symmetric?
These problems are connected  as it is well known. For example,
if we deny the passage of time and assume the tenseless notion of exis-
tence, we end up with eternalism, this being the view that can be easily
reconciled with the theory of relativity. In this case, we do not have
difficulty with (2, 4, and 5), but  instead  we have problems with (3)
and with vindicating MLE and MLE′. If we assume the existence of the
passage of time and the tensed notion of existence, in turn, then we must
answer questions (2), (4) and (5), each of which is not trouble-free. It
can be seen from this that there is no simple and easy solution to the
controversy between presentism and eternalism but it can in no way be
treated as pointless and non-existent.
5. The triviality objection once again: Conclusions
I have tried to show that we can avoid the triviality problem concerning
the controversy over the temporal structure of the world, called the con-
troversy between presentism and eternalism, if we assume the proposed
versions of dynamic presentism or if we consider it as a debate between
23 This issue arises when we assume the principle that if a relation holds be-
tween two things, then both of those things must exist. See, for example, presentists
[Bigelow, 1996; Markosian, 2004] on one side of the controversy and [Sider, 1999] on
the other side.
24 See, for example, [Gödel, 1949; Prior, 1998], where is claim that the conception
of the distinguished present cannot be reconciled with the theory of relativity and
[Shimony, 1993] on the contrary.
25 See, for example, [Earman, 1974; Gołosz, 2017a,c; Sklar, 1974].
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the A-theory and B-theory of time (or  using Meyer’s outdated terms 
between tensed and tenseless theories of time).
Now, however, an interesting question arises related to this second so-
lution of the triviality problem: how is it possible that the metalinguistic
approach which is used in the debate between A-theorists and B-theorists
allows us to avoid the triviality problem? Should not the metalinguis-
tic approach lead to the same problems as presentism/eternalism in the
one-sentence formulation of these positions: “Only present things exist”/
“Past, present, and future things exist” (in the tensed or detensed way)?
The explanation of the point at issue seems to be simple and lies in the
holistic line of attack to the problem proposed by the A-theorists and
B-theorists. When we ponder whether the tensed structure of our lan-
guage corresponds to the real metaphysical structure of our world, not
only do we analyze the one-sentence statements “Only present things
exist”/ “Past, present, and future things exist” (expressed in the tensed
or detensed way), but we also have to analyze deep and difficult prob-
lems such as, for example, MLP, MLE, and 1–7 listed above. They
involve such profound metaphysical and epistemological questions as,
for example: whether there are for any true sentence some things in the
world which make it true and, especially, whether do past-tensed and
future-tensed sentences need presently existing truthmakers; what the
source is of our experience of time and of the tensed structure of our
language; how we should metaphysically interpret physical theories such
as theory of relativity; what the nature of causation is and the origin of
its asymmetry.
It seems, then, that the ontological controversy between presentism
and eternalism can be alternatively converted into one over the language
which we use to describe the world and over the relation between lan-
guage and reality in such a way that it allows us to avoid the triviality
problem. It does not mean, of course, that what there is depends on
words. It is not so just because what we really do in such an approach is
simply to look for the best conceptual scheme for describing the world.
Some of the problems to which this approach leads have been discussed
in philosophy since the time of Heraclitus and Parmenides. They refer
to the deep metaphysical structure of the world and need to be analyzed
and resolved, and  I must repeat  are in no way trivial.
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